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PREFACE
•

Taiwan is an island nation whose economic viability and security in large measure depends
on ocean commerce. Insuring the uninterrupted continuation of this commerce in time of war
or national emergency must be given a high priority in national security planning. History has
repeatedly shown that nations whose economic well-being and security rely on the unrestricted
use of the oceans, particularly island nations, put their very existence at risk ·w hen they assign a
lesser priority, or not priority at all, to maintaining adequate maritime assets. Assets here are
defmed as a national flag merchant marine, shipyards, and seaports.
The United States, since the earliest English settlements, has been a country very much
dependent on the sea. Shipping and commerce dominated its economy for over 200 years ( 16501850). The American Navy was birthed by its merchant marine.. By the mid 19th century the
world's largest merchant fleet flew the United States flag. During World War II American
shipyards built over 6,000 merchant-type vessels, and at the end of the war over 5,000 U.S.-flag
ships were at sea. Millions of tons of war material and millions of troops passed through United
States seaports. In every major American war, maritime assets (merchant ships, shipyards, and
seaports) have played a crucial role in achieving the fmal victory.
But more important than the statistics is the fact that the American people and their
government reco~nize the importance of a strong maritime posture. Countless laws were passed
and regulations promulgated to achieve such an end.
In 1989 most of these laws are still on the books, yet the United States can only be ranked as
a second order commercial maritime power. The difference between now and an earlier time is
that the American government in 1981 made a conscious decision to focus national security
spending on its armed forces to the neglect ofits maritime assets.* The two most oft cited reasons
for this policy were (1) the United States can rely on American owned, foreign flag, foreign
crewed ships in an emergency, and (2) American shipyards are high cost when compared to
foreign yards, hence s11bsidies to support them is a poor use of funds given the ''more important''
requirements of the armed forces.
This paper examines Taiwan's maritime policy under the assumption that the Republic of
China recognizes, or is willing to recognize, its maritime assets as essential elements in its overall
defense planning. In this context, American laws, both past and presently exiting, that were
passed to insure that adequate maritime assets were in place in the event of war or national
emergency, are analyzed as to their relevance for Taiwan.
A number of people and organizations have contributed to this essay. The financial support
of the Strom Thurmond Institute is gratefully acknowledged, as is the secretarial support
provided by the Department of Management Science of the National Chiao Tung University .
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Edmand Chang, Associate Professor of Transportation Engineering and Management, National
Chiao Tung University, has been most helpful in scheduling visits to several shipping companies,
theChinaShipbuildingCorporationshipyardatKeelung,theNationalTaiwanOceanUniversity,
as well as a visit to a small boat yard in Keelung. Dr. Soushan Wu, Professor of Finance and
Info1mation Systems, National Chiao Tung University, significantly aided the project by
arranging interviews with knowledgeable Taiwan officials, including a visit with Admiral Yeh
Chang-tung, Commander-in-Chief of the R.O.C. Navyo
Between August 20-24, 1989 a round island tour was made ofall ofTaiwan's ocean terminals.
The tour was in support of research being conducted by Professor Edmand Chang of National
Chiao Tung University on ways to increase domestic ocean shipping services on Taiwan. As a
member ofthe tour team, I acknowledge with thanks the briefings and facility visits provided by
the respective harbor bureaus as well as those by Taipower, Chinese Petroleum, and China Steel
Corporation officials.
.

The opportunity to visit the Chinese Naval Academy at Tsoying, meet with Superintendent
Vice Admiral Sun Wei-Hui and his staff, and the address the midshipmen and faculty was most
appreci~ted, as was the opportunity to meet Vice Admiral Chen Li-Chung, Commandant,
Chinese Naval Command and Staff College, and to address the current group of senior officers
in residence. Last, is my gratitude and thanks to Dr. J. J. Hwang, Chaj1man, Department of
Management Science at Chiao Tung University, for his unfailing help to a foreign visiting
professor who was constantly in need of help.
The opinions, conclusions, and any errors of fact, are solely the responsibility of the author
and do not imply any endorsement by the Strom Thurmond Institute, the National Chiao Tung
University, or any individual whose assistance was acknowledged above.

*In the American system, laws may remain on the books while appropriations to implement the
·
intent of the law remain unfunded.
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CHAPTER!
INTRODUCTION
The Republic of China (Taiwan's) foreign trade is the bedrock foundation of its eco
nomic viability. For the most part, this trade moves in ocean-going ves,sels.
Taiwan is also a maritime nation in the traditional sense. It possesses a substantial
merchant marine under its own flag, shipbuilding/ship repair yards, a number of deep-water
seaports to service it cx;ean-borne commerce, and naval forces of sufficient strength to dis
courage foreign interference with its ocean commerce. These are the classic elements of
seapower.
Table 1-6 and Figure 1 document the above elements with respect to the Republic of
China, while Tables 7 and 8 indicate the extent to which the country depends upon its ocean
trade. Table 1 shows the total amount of shipping under the R.O.C. flag. Counting only
ocean-going vessels of 1,000 gross tons and over, Taiwan would rank 21st in the world in
deadweight tonnage and 25th in number of ships.
Table 2 indicates the composition of the R.O.C. Navy. With respect to the Far East, in
te1ms of major combatants (destroyers, frigates and submarines), the Republic of China's
naval forces are only exceeded by those of Japan and the People's Republic of China, exclud
ing the United States and the Soviet Union. Tables 3-5 compare Taiwan's shipbuilding
industry to those of other major shipbuilding nations. The table indicates that Taiwan, in the
first quarter of 1989, ranked among the top five.
Table 6 indicates that R. 0.C. -flag ships carry a respectable part of the nation's foreign
trade. By way of comparison, the United States' merchant marine carries less than 4 percent
of its ocean commerce.
Table 7 reemphasizes how important foreign trade is to a small island nation of some 20
million people. Table 8 compares tonnages passing through Taiwan ports. Kaohsiung is the
3rd largest containerport in the world (after Hong Kong and Rotterdam). Table ,8, in con
junction with Figure 1, points up the significant imbalance of tonnage moved as between
Taiwan's west and northeast coast ports and its east coast ports of Hualien and Suao.
As an island nation lacking in a number of raw materials essential to the mcxiern indus
trial state-oil, coal, and minerals in particular and a nation whose gross domestic product
f11i11ly rests upon its exports, Taiwan, more that most countries, must insure that its ocean
commerce is carried on without interruption. Its situation is not unlike that of other island
economic powers such as Great Britain and Japan. It then follows that a long run maritime
strategy for the Republic of China on Taiwan must not only look to maintaining its maritime
rank in peacetime, as essential as that may be, but also to insuring that its maritime assets
meet the nation's needs in time or war or national emergency.
This raises the question · what are the likely threats to Taiwan's ocean-borne com
merce?1 One is a full scale military invasion of the island by mainland China. In this regard,
it has been repeatedly noted, but worth stating again, that the mainland Communist govern
ment has never explicitly renounced the use of force to ''reunify'' China.
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TABLE 1
REPUBLIC OF CHINA COMMERCIAL FLEET, JANUARY 1, 1988

Vessel Type

Number

Gross Tonnage

Passenger
Freighters, including
containerships
Mixed Service Ships
Tugs and Lighters
Fishing Boats
Other

19
484

9,762
6,071,635

42
307
10,857
390

34,141
53,932
922,556
89,062

Total

12,099

7,181,088

Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1988, Council for Economic Planning and
Development, Taipei, Republic of China, p. 133.
The second threat is for mainland air and naval forces to blockade Taiwan, that is, sever
the island's oceans links with the rest of the world. In this scenario, a military invasion
would be ruled out in favor of ''starving'' the island into submission. This was Ge11nany' s
strategy against Great Britain in World Wars I and II. It failed both times because there were
merchant ships in sufficient n11mbers to overcome the blockade. In countering either threat,
the R.O.C. 's merchant marine will play a crucial role. The blockade scenario is considered
the more likely for several reasons.
• Foreign intervention would be less likely.
• It would be relatively easy for mainland China to create an incident as an excuse for a
blockade.
• A blockade would not destroy the world-admired industrial infrastructure of Taiwan.
Simply put, the mainland comrot1nist government would be reluctant to kill the ''
goose laying the golden eggs.''
• A blockade environment renders a general population more susceptible to propaganda
and promises.
• The concept of limited conflict has gained international credibility. In other words,
the world has become accustom to the idea. Examples include the Berlin blockade,
the Korean and Vietnam Wars,the Falkland Islands War, and the Iran-Iraq conflict, a
land war that evolved into a war of attrition at sea, and ultimately involved naval
forces of the United States, the Soviet Union, and other European countries.
0

Surrounding and isolating an objective in preference to a frontal assault is an historic
practice of the People's Liberation Army. ·It is quite likely that the doctrine has
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TABLE2
ROC NAVAL FORCES, 1988

Classification

•

Number in 1988

Non-Amphibious
Submarines
Destroyers
Frigates
Coivettes
Fast Attack (Missile) Craft
Coastal Patrol Craft
Inshore Patrol Craft
Mine Warfare Ships
Mine Sweeping Boats
Repair Ships
Transports
Salvage Ships
Survey Vessels
Fleet Tankers
Cargo Support Ships
Tugs
Floating Docks
Service Craft
Amphibious
I .anding Ship Dock
I .anding Ships
U till ty Landing Craft
Landing Craft Medium
Small I .anding Craft

4

24
10

4

62
28
16
13
9

I
5
1

5
7
l
14
5
25
1
28

22
258
150

Source: Jane's Fig'1ting Ships, 1988-89 (Taiwan Edition)
( Jane's Publishing Company: London) 1988, p. 499.
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TABLE3
SHIP ORDERS-COUNTRY OF FLAG BY DWT, JANUARY-MARCH 1989-

Rank/Country of Fla~
1
2
3
4

5
6

7
8
9
10

Liberia
Panama
Denmark
Korea (ROK)
Norway
Italy
Brazil

TotalD

.

U.S.S.R.
Flag unknown
Japan

9,954,302
5,453,559
2,152,498
2,030,944
1,682,719
1,659,448
1,384,425
1,330,684
1,305,100
1,102,570

•

•

•

•

•

•

17

TAIWAN (ROC)

•

785,650

Total Number~
.

t

126
107
61
21
33
37
33
155
12
49

~

.

10

o

••

Dfil

Dry cargo (Exel containerships) 25,000
Tanker
313,650
Bulk kore carrier
477,000
785,650

Number
3
4

l
10

•Source: Fairplay International Shipping Weekly, "World Orderbook Statistics" (27 April 1989)
hExcludes passenger, miscellaneous and offshore vessels because of difficulty of estimaing their deadweight tonnages. Includes
international registry.

'

TABLE 4

SHIP ORDERS-COUNTRY OF DO'MICILE BY NUMBER, JANUARY-MARCH 1989'1

Rank/Country of Domicileb

Vl

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

U.S.S.R.
Japan
Denmark
Great Britain
United States
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Ge1111any, FRO
Brazil

Tom}DWf

Total Number

1,3.30,684
6,121 .,9.32
2,342,005
2,481,983
3,783,530
1,663,048
361,346
2,559,8.25
880,,007
1,,384.,425

195
164
84
77
58
57
56
50
48
34

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Number
25

TAIWAN

379,950

10... Dry cargo
Containership
Tanker

3
2
4

Passenger

I10

asource: Fairplay International Shipping Weekly, World Orderbook Statistics'' (27 April 1989)
hincludes international registry.

TABLE 5

SHIP ORDERS-COUNTRY OF BUILD BY DWT, JANUARY-MARCH 1989

Rank/Country of Flag
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
•

•

Japan
Korea(ROK)
Yugoslavia
Brazil
TAIWAN (ROC)
Italy
Spain
Denmark
China(PRC)
Poland

TotalDWT
.

11,652,437
10,901,211
2,230,480
2,204,325
1,736,850
1,662,448
1,455,340
1,196,698
1,165,446
1,139,190

Total Number
220
123
51
43
Deadweight
13.... Containerships
92,200
38 Crude oil carrier 303,650
48 Bulk ore carrier 1,341,000
47
1,736,850
56
49

Number
2
2
-9

13

asource: Fairplay International Shipping Weekly, World Orderbook Statistics" (27 April 1989)
bExcludes Passenger, miscellaneous and offshore vessels because of difficulty ofestimating their deadweight tonnages
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TABLE 6
ROC-FLAG VESSEL SHARE OF FOREIGN TRADE, 1987
IMPORTS
Metric tons (000)

ROC-Flag Percent-Metric tons (000)

83,014

30.5%

(25,304)
•

EXPORTS

18,086
Total

19.9%

(3,592)
(28,896)

101,100

Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1988, Council for Economic Planning and
Development, Taipei, Republic of China, p. 132.
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TABLE 7
VALUE OF TAIWAN'S PRINCIPAL EXPORTS/IMPORTS, 1987
(000 U.S.$)

Exports
Electrical Machinery & Apparatus
Textile Products
Plastic Articles
Metal Manufactures

13,480,811
8,963,814
4,655,478
3,226,592

Other

23,211,522
53,538,217

Imports
Electrical Apparatus & Equipment
Machinery
Crude Oil
Iron and Stee!
Basic Petroleum Chemicals
Transportation Equipment
Non-Iron Metals and Products
Miscellaneous Chemical Manufactures
Basic Industrial Chemicals
Soybeans, Wheat and Com
Pulp Paper, Printing and Publishing
Coal and Coal Products
Miscellaneous Food Products
Cotton
Slaughtered Meat

6,262,320
3,845,883
2,527,541
2,315,036
1,659,426
1,630,511
1,407,912
1,336,941
990,613
904,100
716,450
617,960
554,063
527,455
494,199

Other

8,716,077

34,506,497

Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1988, Council for Economic Planning and
Development, Taipei, Republic of China, pp. 201-49.

.
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TABLE 8

•

FREIGHT HANDLED AT ROC PORTS, 1980-87
(Thousands of metric tons)

•

Year

Kaoshsiun~

Keelun~

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

71,850
76,168
76,610
93,995
113,274
118,572
143,747

35,186
33,616
33,282
41,942
53,487
49,936
66,173

160,510

1980-87

854,726

Hualien

Taichun~

Suao

4,747
5,888
6,599
7,551
7,684
9,917
9,472

79,851

3,398
3,683
4,166
4,406
3,756
3,902
4,608
4,494

11,912

1,269
1,831
1,927
2,877
3,252
3,583
3,489
3,15 l

393,473

32,413

63,770

21,979

Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1988, Council for Economic Planning and Development,
Taipei, Republic of China, p. 130.
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Figure 1 -Principal ROC Ports and Shipyards, 1989
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carried over into naval strategic thinking. The heavy communist shelling of Quemoy
(40,000 + shells) on 23 August and the 27 August ultimatum by the communists for the
island's surrender, lend support to the thesis.
• The relatively mild world response to the massacre of hundred of students in Peking
in June 1989 (no government broke diplomatic relations), can only convey to the
mainland Chinese leaders the message that foreign ''intervention'1 in China's internal
affairs is less likely than might have been thought earlier. Mainland China has alway
sinsisted the Taiwan issue was an internal affair.

Taiwan's Long Logistics Pipeline
The routes over which Taiwan's commerce moves are some of the longest in the world.
Imports, in particular, flow through a very long logistics pipeline.- oil from the Persian Gulf
and coal from Australia, the United States, and South Africa are good examples. Figure 2
shows the R.O.C. 's principal ocean trade routes. Table 9 gives an indication of the distances
involved.

In a national security contex4 long distances (over which imports and exports move)
means a greater number of national-flag ships will be needed in an emergency. This follows
from the fact that a blockade of Taiwan by mainland China would certainly cause the with
drawal of most, if not all, foreign ships serving these routes. In the case of shorter routes,
port efficiencies (faster ship turnaround) can significantly mitigate the effect of tonnage
shortfalls. On longer routes, however, there is no substitute for ship numbers.
•

The number of additional national-flag ships needed can be estimated by noting the
amount of foreign flag tonnage on these routes in peacetime, and then subtracting from that
figure tonnages engaged in non-essential movements. More precise estimates would allow
for existing stockpiles and shifts that would take place in the island's production facilities,
i.e. shifting resources to essential from non-essential uses.

Notes
1

There are, of course, numerous threats to Taiwan's security aside fo1111 strictly military
actions. The ones most often cited are infiltration by trained cadre with the aim of creating
civil unrest, and sabotage.

11
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TABLE9
DISTANCES FROM TAIWAN TO MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS
(Nautical Miles)

Kaohsiung to:
Calcutta ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
4,750
.
Capetown ................................................................................................................. 7,371
New Castle (Australia) ............................................................................................ 5,000
Vancouver .............................. :......................

o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.00

5,400

New York............................................................................................................... . 11,535
New Orleans ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••o••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 10,750
Keelung to:

•

Djakarta
2,158
Fusan .................................................................................
715
Hong Kong ............................................................................................................................................................ 475
Kobe ..............................................................................., ................................................................................... 926
Manila
723
Singapore ................................................................................................................. 1,821
0 ..............................................................................

Kuwait ......................................................................................................................5,657
Marseilles ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••e 8,397
Liverpool •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••o••o•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
9,575
Hamburg ............................................................................................................................................ 10,404

Source: Distance Tables-World Pons, The Nippon Shipping Exchange, Tokyo, Japan, 1974.
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CHAPTER2
MERCHANTSHIPS
Under an ideal arrangement, a nation's merchant marine would be operated under the
following conditions.
• Vessel price would be detexrnined by worldwide supply and demand, including the
cost of capital. In other words, the ship operator would purchase his ship(s) in a
competitive marketplace.
• Vessel operating costs

wages, fuel, etc.-would be world-competitive.

• Tax treatment of vessel earnings would be internationally unifo1r11.
• Vessel operating, safety, and construction standards would adhere to an internation
ally enforced no1111. This would include crew size and crew qualifications.
• Vessel specifications would equally satisfy peacetime commercial requirements and
wartime national security needs, that is, the vessel could serve one use or the other
without significant modifications.
When all of the above conditions are met, it follows that there would be little incentive
for a ship operator to register his vessel under a foreign flag or crew them with foreign
nationals. It also follows that little, if any, government expenditure would be required to
support a national-flag merchant marine. This is not to say, however, that a government
could not positively encourage the use of national-flag vessels by cargo p:r:eference schemes
and/or bilateral cargo sharing agreements with its trading partners.
Relatively few nations possess all of the essentials for operating a world-competitive
merchant marine. The poorer countries cannot afford the ships and the huge outlay of funds
necessary to support large fleets. On the other hand, wealthy countries, having high stan
dards of living, which translate into high wage rates, cannot match the lower wage costs of
Third World nations. In 1989, the preferred solution is for higher wage nations to register
their ships in low wage countries or under an international register, which in practice, comes
to the same thing.

The American Experience
The United States became a high cost producer of shipping service in the latter part of
the 19th century and remains so today. In an omnibus piece of legislation, the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936, the high operating cost problem was addressed primarily by use of an
operating differential subsidy (ODS).'
Under Title VI of the Act, a ship operator receives from the government the difference
between his operating costs and a weighted average of those of his competitors, on all items
where the American operator is at a substantial cost disadvantage. In return, the subsidized
vessel will be built in the United States, will operate in a trade considered essential to the
United States, and the operator will agree to replace the tonnage when it becomes obsolete. 1

15

TABLE 10
MAJOR ROC SHIPPING F'IRMS, 1988

Company

Vessel Type

Routes

Evergreen Marine

Container

Taiwan-U.S. east and west coasts;
worldwide (Taiwan-USA-Europe);
Taiwan-Mediterranean

Yang Ming Lines

Container
Bulk carriers
Multipurpose

Taiwan-Australia, Japan, Korea,
U.S. west coast, Europe, and
tramp operations

Chinese Petrole11m
Corporation

Tankers

Taiwan-Persian Gulf, Indonesia,
Caribbean

Chinese Maritime
Trust, Ltd.

Container
Bulk carrier
Ore carrier

Taiwan-Europe, Australia, Far East,
U.S.A. and u·amp operations
.

Taiwan Navigation
Company

Bulk carrier
Multipurpose
Passenger

Tai.wanC>U.S. west coast, Persian
Gulf, domestic trades, and tramp
operations

Other ( 106 frrms)

Integrated tug-barge,
container, bulk/ore
carriers, tankers, dry cargo
reefer, log carrier, cement
•
earner, passenger

General foreign and domestic

Source: Annual Repon ( 1988), Ministry of Communications, Republic of China, pp. 1-117.
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TABLE .11

l\llLITARILY USEFU.L VESSELS AND STRATEGIC IMPORT CARRIERS, OCTOBER 1, 1988•
(300 grt and over)
Rank/Country Flafi

)

•

1
2
3
4
5
6

Panama*
United States
Ge11nany-FRG
U.S.S.R.
TAIWAN (ROC)
Japan

1
2
3
4
5
6

Japan
Panama*
U.S.S.R.
Greece
Liberia*
China (PRC)

177
105
90
81
67
55

VX··,>:· g. ~G·

"

lt--1"
a~,>VIIRYI
,,. ,., ,,xx,

Ian~,rp, ((X)())
No.D

3.,800
3,071
.1,824
642
2,018
1,617

•

3874
3753
2596
1455
1428
141.2

45,361
69,974
25,027
38,772
93,453
18,803

246

6,972

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

30TAIWAN (ROC)
........
\0

1
2
3
4
5
6

Japan
Panama*
Liberia*
U.S.S.R.
Greece
United States

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

39TAIWAN (ROC)
1
2
3
4
•

Panama*
Liberia*
Greece
Cvorus*

6 UssRpi,,v~

861
597
488
402
272
255

16,928
19,975
57,113
6,842
16,331
15,792

13

861
802
506
419
418
272
231

30,121
28,619
18,310
16,012
12,608
6,349

49

3,461

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

24TAIWAN

• Source: Shipping ~tatistics (Ja~uary 1989) Institute of S.h~iQPing Economics and Logistics, Bremen, Federal Republic of Ge1·111any.
b
Dot?S not include special purpose ·vessels e.g.. LNG, chemical carriers, etc.
Includes femes
* Flag of convenience countries

•

For a nation of only 20 mi11ion, Taiwan's merchant marine is im:pressive: The ~orld's
largest container fleet is owned by Taiwan-based Eve~green Co!Poratton and its afftl~ates.
When the entire commercial fleet is considered, there 1s approximately one ocean gomg
vessel for every 1600 R.O.C. citizens.
The major problem facing the R.O.C. ship operator is the widenin~ ~erenc~ between
his crew costs and those of his competitors. As the R.O.C. standard of livmg continues to
increase, the issue will become critical. By the end of 1989, Taiwan's per capita income will
approach $7,000 annually and will be one of the highest in Asia. On the other han~, Philip
pine per capita income is $670 annually. Table 12 contrasts Taiwan's ere"!' costs with other
Asian countries. In the worst case, R.O.C. wages are almost 40 percent higher than the
lowest alternative shown.
Maritime education, training and research is primarily carried out at the National Taiwan
Ocean University in Keelung. The school offers degrees in a number of maritime related
fields in addition to preparing students to serve as masters, mates and senior engineers on
R.O.C.-flag ships. An intensive in-service training program to raise the qualifications of
RoO.C. ship officers is also in place, and since 1981 has provided training to over 32,0()()
students. Graduates of the Ocean University, like graduates at all Taiwan universities, are
required to complete two years of military service plus a reserve commitment. In years past,
there was a more formal tie between the Ocean University graduate and the R.O.C. Navy. In
1989, such links are tenuous at best.
In addition to the Ocean University, two maritime academies Gunior colleges) are
sources of junior merchant marine officers.
Maritime education by the private sector largely rests with the Evergreen Marine Corpo
ration and its training ship MV Ever Trust. This 15,000 ton containership was completely
remodeled as a floating classroom in 1983. The vessel is capable of providing on board
training for 200 faculty and cadets.
Taiwan does not have a comprehensive shipping act to support merchant marine such as
the American Merchant Marine Ac~ of 1936 and its amendments. Compared to the United
States, R.O.C. government financial support of its national flag shipping is quite limited.
Aids include:
• Income taxes do not apply to newly built ships registered in Taiwan for a period of
five years.
• All cargo destined for R.O.C. authorities must be carried on Taiwan-owned ships.
• Taiwan and South Korea have an equal share cargo sharing agreement in their
bilateral trade.
The R.O.C. merchant fleet is divided between private sector and government-owned
fleets. Evergreen Corporation and the Chinese Maritime Trust are privately owned, while
Yang Ming, Chinese Petroleum and the Taiwan Navigation Company are government
owned. There are 50 vessels in the government owned fleet, including four ore carriers
operated by the China Steel Corporation.
The Evergreen fleet is broken down into Evergreen Marine Corporation ships under the
R.~.C. flag (38 s~ps), Ev~gre~n _International, S_.A. ships under the P3:11amanian flag (17
ships), and the Umglory Lme, divided between R.O.C. and Panam& regtstry (15 ships).
Evergreen and its subsidiaries operate the world's largest containership fleet. The Chinese
Maritime Trust is a Taiwan domiciled finn that operate ships under Hong Kong and Taiwan
registries.
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TABLE 12•
•

CREW COST COMPARISON-TAIWAN AND SELECTED ASIAN AND ASIAN CREW COMBINATIONS,
SEPTEMBER 1.988•

Country/Crew Combination
TAIWAN (ROC)
British-AMOSO
British-Filipino
Taiwan-Filipino
Hong Kong
Korea (ROK)
Hong Kong-Filipino
China (PRC)
AMOSO

,j

'

Annual Wa~e

Percent of Taiwan Wa~e

$528,870

I00.00

,514,201
503,069
50,2,046
473,681
471,014
470,713
459,'7 l 1
309,485

97.23
95.l,2
94.93
89.56
.
89.06
89.00
86.9,2
58.52

Wa~e Difference
0.00
-14,669
-25,801
-26,824
-55,189
-57,856
-58,157
-69,159
-219,358

N

......

•Source: Chinese Maritime Trust

Notes
Standard crew complement: 22 crew members, i'ncluding 'Master
Master, Chief Officer:, 2d Officer, Chief Engineer, ,2d Engineer, 3d Engineer Electrician and C(X)k are
Hong Kong-Filipino:
Hong Kong Crew
Master, Chief O,fficer, ,2d Officer, Chief Engineer, 2d Engineer, 3d Engineer Electrician and C(X)k are
Taiwan-Filipino:
Taiwan Crew
British-Filipino:
Master, Chief Officer,, Chief Engineer,, ,2d Engineer (B.r), Electrician is Indian
British AMOSO:
British Officers and Contract .F ilipino Crew
Crew traveling cost not included. All cost show.n is on annual basis.
Allowance for ULCC and VLCC (For Chinese Master, CO, CE, 2dE only) are not included. 'For ULCC Master and CE US400 month;
CO, 2dE US$200 month. For VLCC half the rate o,f ULCC
AMOSO is a Filipino crew manning company. Engages crew per agreement with vessel owner.

Both government-owned lines and private sector operators have ships on ord~r. E':er
green has begun negotiations in Japan to build up to twenty two 4,000 TEU containersh1ps.
In March 1989, the R.O.C. government approved plans by Yang_~g Line to con~truct _14
new 3500 TEU containerships, while Chinese Petroleum was building one crude 011 earner of
152,650 dwt.

Table 13 lists the general role of m~rchant ships in time of war o~ na?<?nal eme~ge~cy.
Specific roles and the priority of uses will, of course, depend upon an 1ndiV1dual nation s
req11irements. Republic of China government actions to insure maximum effectiveness of its
merchant marine in time of crisis would include:
• Insuring that a substantial part of its merchant fleet is registered under the national
flag with -national flag crews.
•

• Maintaining a continuously updated roster of its merchant shipping, including detailed
inf01mation on every vessel characteristic that would be important in a national
emergency.
• Having plans in place for merchant ships at sea when hostilities occur.
• Holding joint training exercises and educational/mfo1mation exchanges between naval
and merchant ships and naval and merchant marine officers.
• Maintaining continuously updated plans to acq11ire foreign-owned ships should the
need arise.
0

• Maintaining a reserve pool of q1.1a)ified merchant marine officers and seamen, particu
larly if the nation has an inactive fleet in a reserve status.
• Plans to return foreign-flag tonnage owned by citizens to national control, including
plans to crew this tonnage with national flag officers and seamen.
• Adding national defense features to national flag tonnage and foreign flag tonnage
owned by nationals. At a minim11m, plans should be in place to add these features at
the outbreak of hostilities.
e

EDUCATING 'l'HE GENERAL PUBLIC, LEGISLATORS, GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS AND 'l'HE NATION'S OFFICER CORPS TO 'l'HE FACT THAT
EXPENDITURES TO
- .L.&A..,IE 'IHE EFF'ECTIVENESS OF 'IHE NATION'S
MERCHANT MARINE IN A WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY ARE, IN
FACT, NATIONAL SECURITY EXPENDITURES AND MUST BE CONSID
ERED AS SUCH.

Evaluation of the American Experience: Relevance For Taiwan
In planning to maximize the usefulness of Taiwan's merchant ships in a war or national
emergency, a number of American programs having the same purpose are worth considering.
Many are not.

Operating Differential Subsidies
.

If R.O.C. flag ship operators were to express an opinion, without question, they would
state that high R.O.C. wages compared to the wages of their competitors, poses the greatest
22

TABLE 13
GENERAL ROLE OF MERCHANT SHIPS IN TIME OF WAR
OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY
•

No Modification or Minor Modification to Vessel
I. Logistics Support of Deployed Military Forces
II. Carry on Essential Ocean Commerce
A. Strategic Imports
1. Raw materials (Coal, crude oil, ores, etc.)
2. Essential manufactures

B. Exports (e.g. Iran and Iraq to finance war effort)

Major Modification to Vessel
I. Naval Auxiliaries
A. Repair Ships
B. Minesweepers/Hunters, Mine Laying Ships
C. Salvage Ships
D. Escort Vessels
E. Intelligence Ships
II. Fleet Support Vessels (Support of Deployed Naval Forces
A. Combat Stores Ships
B. Ammunition Ships

C. Replenishment Oilers

m. Military Auxiliaries
A. Troop Carriers

•
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threat to their long run economic viability. This fair~y pl_a~es th~ R.O.~.. government on the
horns of a dilemma. Increasing living standards ~or its ~1ttzens 1~ a legitimate goal, however,
increased living standards implies higher wages, mcluding seagoing wages. Table 12 clearly
shows the problem.
The United States, historically, has faced the same paradoxo To ~sure th~ existence of a
substantial U.S.-flag merchant fleet, it opted for an O\Jeratin~ differential -subsidy progr~ as
desc1ibed above. While the program was successful m keepmg a U.S.-flag merchant manne
at sea, it was also severely c1iticized because of its high cost. However, a lar~e part of the
excessive cost of the program was its abuse by ship operators and seamen uruons. Large,
inefficient crews became the no1m with little resistance from shipping firms. One long te1111
result of this abuse is shown below.

Comparative Crew Costs,1987
Daily Cost
Ship Type
Liner

OECD Flag

Non-OECD Flag

$9,500

$4,000

$1,500

Dry Bulk

6,500

2,600

1,300

Tanker

6,500

2,600

1,300

Source: Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense, Hearings, 1988 p.850

It was the case of a sound concept being poorly admin.i stered.
If the R.O.C. does not, in some manner, equalize the wages between R.O.C. crews and
lower cost options, the predictable result will be a transfer of R.O.C.-owned ships to lower
cost foreign flags. This was what occurred with respect to American owned ships in the
immc:-..diate post World W-ar Il period (1945-60) that were not eligible at the time for subsidy,
that is, dry bulkers and tankers.
A second option to keep a national flag fleet in place would be for the R.O.C. govern
ment to expand the size of its publicly owned fleets. e.g. the Yang Ming Line. This, how
ever, would not solve the high R.O.C. wage problem but only transfer it from one govern
ment agency to another. A last option is for the R.O.C. government to establish and maintain
a reserve fleet of government-owned merchant ships. Of necessity, these ships would have to
be maintained in a high degree of readiness.
The American experience strongly suggests that the R.O.C. government consider and operat
ing differential subsidy for wages only. (There is no evidence that R.O.C.-flag ships suffer a
disadvantage in other operating costs).
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The option of a reserve fleet is ruled out primarily because of its very high cost and the
fact ~at ~e ships would be concentrated at one or more reserve fleet sites and subject to
possible arr attacks even before activation was begun. Moreover, crewing reserve ships
would require maintaining an active pool of R.O.C. officers and seamen, in itself, a very
costly undertaking.
Allowing a significant portion of R.O.C.-owned ships to transfer to a foreign flag and
then, after the fact, ascribing some national security value to this shipping, fails for the same
reason it fails in the case of the United States the likely unwillingness of foreign crews sail
the ships to Taiwan in wartime, particularly in the face of a large mainland China submarine
fleet It might also be noted that a 1986 resolution by the International Transport Workers
Federation (l'l'F) gives seamen the right not to sail into warlike operations areas. The resolu
tion was affumed by the Joint Maritime Committee of the International Labor Organization
(ILO).
•

Maritime Education!fraining
Existing maritime education and training in the Republic of China is of good quality
with adequate facilities. In 1989 there would seem to be no compelling reason for any
significant increase in government maritime education expenditures. The relevant American
lesson is that government support must confo1111 to the demands of the marketplace and that
excessive suppon can bring about an over supply of officers. Should, however, Evergreen
discontinue its ''open door'' policy with respect to general use of its training ship Ever Trust,
or should future demands exceed the ship's capability, then the government would have to
provide the required ship or ships. However, every encouragement should be given to
continue the present arrangement.
The weakness of present maritime education/training programs is their almost exclusive
focus on commercial maritime subjects. The American experience suggests that courses in
naval science for merchant marine officers are well worth the effort.. And since merchant
marine officers are educated at government-supported institutions, there should be no need to
5
offer a ''bribe'' to the student or to the institution to implement the instruction.
During the Korean and Vietnam Wars, U.S.-flag merchant ships that were used to
support the military effort, were managed on a day to day basis by shipping company offi
cials. Experience showed it was an efficient system.
Should a blockade of Taiwan take place, R.O.C. merchant ships would immediately
come under government authority. However, their operation, in all likelihood, would remain
with the vessel operators. Naval officers are not trained to manage the operation of merchant
ships on a day to day basis even assuming the personnel were available. This suggests that
fo1mal instruction for shipping firm managers with respect to what would be required (of
them) in a national emergency, would be time and funds well spent in peacetime. The United
States has such a program in place.

Navy-Merchant Marine Cooperation

An area where both the United States and the Republic of China fail is in establishing a
close working relationship between their navies and merchant marines. In the United States
where programs are in place, they are largely ignored. A case in point would be where ~
Master or Chief Engineer of a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) or a 4,000 TEU container
ship applied for a merchant marine naval reserve commission. If given, it would be in the
25
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rank of Ensign. The extent of the American failure to coordinate the activities of its mer
chant marine and navy is matter of record. 6
The early American navy combined the merchant and co~bat navy, as ~ally
all successful maritime powers have done through~ut history, mcludin~ the
Soviet Union today. The U.S. Navy and Merchant Manne, by contrast, are vutual
strangers at sea today.
Rear Admiral George H.Miller (Ret.)
Like others who have served as Chief of Naval Operations, I attempted to obtain
some unity of purpose between the U.S. Navy and the Merchant Marine and
supported a growth in strength and reliability ofour Merchant Marine. I a~ sorry
• to report that, just like others, I was frustrated in the attempt by parochial and
bureaucratic government agencies.
Admiral Elmo R. Zunwalt (Ret.)

While fo1mer ChiefofNaval Operations, Thomas E. Moorer, notes: ... the
Merchant Marine...has to be configured so it contributes heavily to the prosperity
and economic viability of our nation in peacetime and is easily convertible to
military operation in wartime.
I would think it would be well from time to time to have exercises... we have to
have a long range plan so that. ..the Merchant Marine can participate in both peace
and war. I think it is a must for both of them. I have tried to do something about
this for some time...
The functions of naval combat forces and functions of the Merchant Marine and
what it takes to make both ofthem viable is the least understood subject in the halls
of the Congress and in the Pentagon.
The merchant mariner who sailed in World War Il could also comment on the sad state
of relations between the U.S. Merchant Marine and the Navy. For 43 years, the World War
Il merchant s~aman fought the bureaucracy, including the Depai tment of the Navy, to gain
recognition for his wartime services, i.e., be granted veteran status. The fact that 740 mer
chant ships were lost and over 5,600 seaman died due to enemy action, counted for little.
Veteran status for those seamen still alive:- was granted in 1988, largely due to a Federal
District Court order which directed the government to ree:xamine. its position on the issue.
National Defense Features (NDFs)

The idea of adding defense features to merchant ships to make them more useful in time
of war dates to antiquity. The United States recommitted itself to the concept in the Mer
chant Marine Act of 1936. As pointed out above, NDFs can be incorporated into new con
struction or added at a later rime. Either way, it is a good investment and has been so proven.
The key points to remember in considering government expenditures for NDFs are (1)
they are relatively inexpensive when contrasted with the purpose they serve in wartime, and
(2) NDFs are not, as might be supposed, limited to general cargo vessels. They can also be
incorporated into bulk and tanker construction. .
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Just how inexpensive NDFs can be was demonstrated in 1972 when the U.S. govern
ment chartered the SS Erna Elizabeth, a handy size, product tanker, to determine the feasibil
ity of ~sing merchant ships in underway (fuel) replenishment roles. Modifications to adapt
th~ ship cost $30,000. During the test, the union-crewed, Erna Elizabeth steamed 13,000
miles and refueled 40 naval vessels, including the carrier John F. Kennedy. Then Chief of
Naval Operations, Elmo Zumwalt, stated:
•

It proved the feasibility of using commercial tankers to consolidate Navy
replenishment ships and to provide limited replenishment of combatant ships.
The knowledge that this surge capability is available can expand the employment
options to our Fleet.
With respect to incorporating NDFs on bulk vessels, in 1983, the Center for Naval
Analyses dete111lined that for a 35,000 dwt geared, bulk carrier, the following NDFs could be
added for less that $1 million.
• Carry break-bulk cargo on existing deck
• Install a Navy compatible communication system
• Eliminate shock-failure-prone gray cast iron from vital systems
• Add water washdown clips
• Add break-bulk storage capacity on twin-deck level
• Carry lighters alongside
• Capability to replenish naval auxiliaries underway, and
• Receive fuel underway.
Having the above work done in a Taiwan shipyard would cost significantly less than in
an American yard.

Fishing Vessels
As indicated in Table 1, Taiwan has almost 11,000 fishing vessels. In time of war or
national emergency, the larger of these vessels could serve in a number of roles, including
intelligence ships and counter mine warfare ships. In World War II, expediency forced Great
Britain to use the basic design of a whale catcher in building convoy escort vessels. The use
of small craft in lifting a large part of the British Expeditionary Forces off the beaches of
Dunkirk in World War II is now legend and needs no retelling here.
1

The R.O.C. fishing fleet could also provide logistics support to deployed forces on
Taiwan should land transport systems (highways and railroads) be interdicted by air strikes,
that is, provide the means of moving war material/supplies from orth Taiwan to the South
or vis-versa. Admiral George Miller points out this use of small craft by the communists in
moving supplies along the coastal waters of Korea and China during the Korean and Vietnam
8
Wars.
Perhaps the greatest potential use of the R.O.C. fishing fleet is not the ships but the men
who crew them. In a blockade of Taiwan by mainland China there will be ship and crew
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losses which must be replaced and there will be a net?C1 f?r crews to man ~ew R.O.C. tonnage
from whatever source it comes. Thus, a comprehensive inventory of fishing fleet assets
would not only dete1,11ine emergency uses for the ships, but also how their crews might best
serve in time of national emergency.
Summary

•

Insuring maximum use of merchant vessels, including the fishing fleet, in rime of na
tional emergency is not without a cost. However, when this cost is contrasted with other
national security expenditures, it, typically, is quite small. In the case of the United States,
the estimated cost of a single B-2 (Stealth) bomber is $600 million. The cost of an operating
differential subsidy in support of 100 merchant ships for one year is $230 million. Giving up
one bomber would keep 250 merchant vessels at sea. (250 ships x $2.3 million= $575
million) Foregoing 20 bombers would keep this fleet at sea for its entire use(ul like of 20
years. Or, 600 bulk cargo ships could be fitted with NDFs by giving up a single B-2.

In the case of the Republic of China, one Ulsan class frigate is estimated to cost $280
million. The annual difference in wages of an R.O.C.-flag, RoO.C. crewed merchant ship and
the lowest Asian crew alternative is $220,000. Simple arithmetic shows that $1 millions
could operationally subsidize four merchant ships for one year. Or, the cost of one frigate
could provide an operating differential subsidy for 60 ships for 20 years. (60 ships x
$220,000 x 20 years = $264 million) Or, the $280 million could be used to add NDFs to the
entire R.O.C.-flag ocean-going merchant marine.
As noted earlier, the ODS concept has been criticized in the United States because of its
cost. The statistic critics generally cite is the current difference in U.S. and foreign seagoing
wages. Generally ignored is the fact that an ODS program, even for all its abuse, kept a
respectable size U.S. merchant marine at sea for over half a century. Without an ODS pro
gram in 1989, the U.So flag merchant marine would consist essentially of those ships in the
protected domestic trades.
What lesson can the Republic of China learn from the American ODS experience? The
most important is that an ODS program must be closely monitored. When this is done, it is
probably the best way to keep a relatively high cost, national flag merchant marine at sea.
With respect to increasing the contacts between Taiwan's merchant shipping community
and its Navy, little is required except the will to put a program in place. Merchant marine
officers can receive instruction in naval science. Periodic exercises between Navy and
merchant.ships can be held. And shipping company managers can be made aware of their
operating responsibilities in a national emergency. Seminars conducted at the Naval Acad
emy at Tsoying and/or the Naval Staff College in Taipei could be easily arranged.
NOTES
1

Recent ODS contract have only included payment for wage differentials. Waiver of the
U.S.-build requirement occurred in 1981.
2

ln 1983, Andrew EoGibson, then President of Delta Steamship Lines, stated that in the
case of one U.S.-flag operator, constructing a vessel to U.S. standards in Japan cost him an
additional $2.5 million.
3

Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense, Public Hearings, February 1987-July
1987, p. 465.
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4

ln addition to its ready reserve merchant ships, the Navy holds title to another 39 mer
chant ships, either as part of its worldwide pre-positioned ship force, or its 10 ship fleet of
fast logistics support vessels based in the United States.
5

1n state supported maritime academies in the United States, an incentive payment of

$100/month is offered to students who agree to accept a commission in the Naval Reserve or
Merchant Marine Naval Reserve. One prerequisite for this assistance is the completion of
naval science courses as a part of their for 111a l studies.
6

Cooperation, of course, exists between U.S. navy-owned/controlled merchant ships and
naval forces. The lack of cooperation is between the private sector merchant marine and the
Depaitment of the Navy.
7

Miller, George H., Provide for the Common Defense, (Washington, D.C.: Washington
Publications, 1988), pp. 62-63.
8

/bid., p. 21.
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CHAPTER3
SHIPYARDS
Shipyards are one of the four major elements of seapower, the others being a merchant
marine, seaports, and naval fore es.
Historically, a nation that possessed a large merchant marine was also a nation that built
ships. In 1989, this no longer the case. Countries with large merchant fleets such as Liberia
(1500 ships of 94 million dwt.), Panama (3200 ships of 67 million dwt.), Cyprus (900 ships
of 22 million dwt.), Bahamas (220 ships of 12 million dwt.), among others, are not maritime
nations. In fact, none of the first five ''flag of convenience'' countries in 1989 have the
capability of building a modem, sophisticated merchant vessel e.g., an LNG or container
ship, much less the capability to build a major naval combatant. As a general proposition, a
nation that can build a modem, ocean-going, merchant ship, can also build naval vessels if it
wishes to invest the necessary capital and acquire the requisite technology.
For 200 years (1650-1850) the United States was a major shipbuilder. However, as ship
technology progressed from wooden hulls and sails, to steel hulls and steam propulsion,
America lost its building advantage. For while great Britain was further advanced in steel
and steam design and technology, a more important reason for America's decline was a
continued increase in wage levels. By 1882, shipbuilding labor costs in England were 44
percent less than in the United States. In 1987, typical United States and South Korea ship
construction costs were:

SOUTH KOREA

U.S.
Liner (2500 TEU)

$125 million

$52 million
•

Dry Bulk (30,000 dwt.)

$59 million

$18 million

Tanker (90,000 dwt.)

$85 million

$38 million

Source: Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense, Hearings, 1988, p. 950.

The American Experience
At the end of World War I, United States aid to its shipbuilders included:
• Ship mortgages guaranteed by federal government
• American domestic trades reserved to U.S. built vessels, i.e., vessels in the
coastal, intercoastal via Panama Canal, offshore (Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico,
Gt1am, and Samoa) trades.
• Preference given to American operators in sale of war-built ships.
• A construction loan fund was authorized. Monies from this fund were available
to ship operators on favorable te1ms.
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The Merchant Marine Act of1936 established the concept of construction differential
subsidies wherein the government paid to the shipyard the difference be~een foreign and
U.S. building costs, that is, allowed the American opera~or to purchase his ves_sel(s) ~om a
U.S. shipyard at world prices. The act also allowed a ship a operator to deposit eam1n%s ~d
revenues from ship sales into a federal tax-deferred account. Income earned on deposits m
the account were also tax free. When funds were withdrawn they had to be used to construct
or reconstruct a U.S. flag, U.S.-built ship.
The Ship Sales Act of1946 made World War IT merchant ships built for government
account, primarily Liberty and Victory ships, available to American companies on a priority
basis at bargain prices.
In 1951, thirty five 20 knot general cargo vessels were built for a government account at
a time when shipping companies in general did not believe a 20 knot ship was economical.
The ships, however, proved successful and became highly prized additions to the American
flag merchant fleet. Ten years later (1962) the world's first nuclear merchant ship, the NS
Savannah, was funded by the government to demonstrate the feasibility of using nuclear
power plants on commercial vessels.
Public Law 97-252 (September 1982) states that no naval vessel or major component
may be constructed in a foreign shipyard unless authorized by the president in the interest of
national security. To what extent was government aid successful in maintaining a shipbuild
ing industry?
As in the case of operating differential subsidies, construction subsidies came in for
heavy criticism. Critics charged that government subsidies led to inefficiencies in shipyard
operations and pointed to the ever widening gap between U.S. and foreign construction costs.
But, as in the case of ODS, funds spend on construction subsidies were never contrasted to
other defense expenditures in a cost-benefit context. Approximately $3.8 billion was spent
on the CDS program between 1937 and 1981. The benefit was that a significant American
shipyard industry was kept in place. By contrast, in 1989 dollars, $3.8 billion could only buy
one and one-half nuclear ballistic missile submarines.
In the long view, the ship mortgage program must be considered a success. As late as
1984, the Federal Ship Financing Fund, which was maintained entirely by user fees, had a
positive balance. However, a number of high risk builds resulted in a series of defaults in the
mid 1980s which depleted the fund. The federal government, as guarantor of the loan, was
obliged to settle the mortgage and take title to the vessel(s). Critics called for an end to the
prog,arn. As in the case of CDS, the concept was sound but the execution flawed.
In 1981 the Reagan administration did not request funds for the CDS program. The
result was that subsidized American operators were allowed to place new ship orders in
overseas shipyards. The Reagan administration argued that increased naval work would be
enough to maintain a shipyard industry that was adequate for national defense purposes.
Whether this assumption is valid is a matter of intense debate in the U.S. maritime commu
nity in 1989. One fact that cannot be overlooked, however, is that since 1982 forty one major
shipyards have closed with the loss of 32,000 shipyard production workers. In this same
period, 45 ships that would have been built under the CDS program were built in foreign
shipyards.
The tax free capital construction fund can be considered an aid to the ship owner, an aid
to the shipyard industry, or an aid to both. By and large, the program has the support of the
maritime industry and the Congress. The current issue is whether monies in the fund can be
used to purchase foreign built ships.
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. At one time, res~rv.ation of the U.S. domestic trades to U.S.-flag, U.S.- built ships, was
an 111~portant ~nde~1nmng of the American shipyard industry. In 1989, the requirement is a
margmal consideration at best. Domestic and intercoastal shipping face fierce competition
from Ian~ transport _systems. Only the Alaska and Hawaii trades promise any hope for new
construction. Certa1nly the reservation did not prevent the closing of some 45 shipyard over
the past seven years. In 1989, no ocean-going merchant vessel is under construction in an
American shipyard.
·

Taiwan's Shipyards
Tables 3-5 (Chapter 1) profile the shipbuilding industry in the Republic of China. The
government owned and operated China Shipbuilding Corporation (CSBC) enjoys a monop
oly with respect to major builds. Its two yards are located in Keelung and Kaohsiung.

•

The Kaohsiung yard has a one million ton dry dock measuring 950 meters x 92 meters
and 14 meters deep. It has 1800 meters of quaywalls. The Keelung yard has three
drydocks two on 130,000 dwt, and one of 30,000 dwt. It also has a building slip of 32,000
dwt and 1600 meters of quaywalls. The Kaohsiung yard is capable of building an ultra large
crude carrier (ULCC) of almost any size desired by an operator.
As shown in Table 5 (Chapter 1), thirteen ships were under construction during the frrst
quarter of 1989 in CSBC) yards. When delivered, they will fly the flags of four nations
Taiwan, Panama, Liberia and Hong Kong (British). In addition to this construction, new
orders in April and May of 1989 added six ships to CSBC's orderbook bringing the total to
19 ships of 1.95 million dwt. The largest of the new orders was for a 149,000 dwt bulk
carrier. 1
In the past, CSBC yards at both Keelung and Kaohsiung have built small naval vessels
such as landing er~ attack (missile) craft and coastal patrol ships. However, the R.O.C. ' s
major surface combatants-<lestroyers and frigates were all built in the United States
between 1943-47. While two Netherlands built patrol submarines joined the fleet in 1987,
diplomatic pressure by mainland China has essentially closed the option of purchasing more
warships in Europe. And under a 1982 agreement with Peking, the United States promised to
gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan. For all intent and purpose, the Republic of China was
left with the choice of modernizing its aging blue water fleet by purchasing small, 1900
displacement ton frigates from South Korea or undertaking a building program of its own. It
was not an easy decision.
In July 1989 a compromise of sorts was reached. Eight frigates were ordered from the
China Shipbuilding CoIJ)oration. They will be modeled on the American Perry class (3600
displacement ton) frigate and will involve technology transfers from U.S. shipyards. The
estimated total cost of the program is NT$ 136 billion (Ships NT$ 39 billion plus weapon
systems NT$ 95.9 billion) The contract is scheduled for completion in 1999 with first ship to
be delivered in 1993.
The cost of the domestic-build alternative is high. China Shipbuilding has been subsi
dized by the government since 1975. And like the cost of seagoing labor, shipyard produc
tion worker wages on Taiwan have increased considerably over the past five years with the
trend certain to continue. Add very high start-up costs and all the problems associated with
building a series of high technology ships, and one has a very, very large defense outlay. A
3
cost overrun of 30 to 40 percent of total program cost is not unlikely.
In addition to the facilities of the China Shipbuilding Corporation, Taiwan has numerous
small boatyards. Most are located in Kaohsiung. These yards can build ships up to 300
-
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gross tons and, on average, employ between 15 and 50 workers. The Ch~nge ~si~g Ship
building yard at Keelung is typical. It employees 20 woi:kers.~d c~ build ships m the 100300 gross ton range. Diesel engines are either of domestic ongm or un~orted from Japan.
4

The yard also has a repair capability. Most orders are for deep sea fishing vessels.
A final shipbuilding capability is Taiwan's yacht manufacturers. This industry is one ?f
worldwide rank with·a capacity to built ocean going sail and power yachts of up to 75 feet m

length.

Evaluating the American Experience: Relevance for Taiwan
In 1989 the United States is the world's highest cost producer of merchant ships. It is

also the premier and, in some cases, only producer of sophisticated naval combatant vessels.
In the field of nuclear naval construction, its shipyards are all but free world monopolists.
Nonetheless, it has been amply documented that naval work alone is insufficient to support

an adequate U.S. shipyard mobilization base-merchant ship construction is also needed.
For almost fifty years, the United States partially supported its shipyards by a construction
differential subsidy. It was found to be the least politically contentious way to provide ·
government aid to a high cost commercial shipbuilding industry. Taiwan labor costs are high
with respect to Asia and fast catching up with OECD countries which puts its shipbuilders
into relatively the same situation as their American counterparts. In 1989 the R.O.C. govern
ment indirectly subsidizes the government-owned China Shipbuilding Corporation. How

ever, state owned industries are seldom efficient and indirect support of state owned indus
tries only adds to inefficiencies.
As Taiwan embarks on its naval building program, budgets and large cost overruns will
be the rule and not the exception. As in all democracies, heated debated over defense pro- .
grams will follow. And there will likely be some support for privatizing the China Ship
building Corporation. But even should privatization come about, the problem of high R.O.C.
shipyard wages will still remain. In this case, a closely monitored CDS program would have
much to commend it
The R.O.C. naval building program has begun and will be expanded, as it must, to
include replacement of aging mine warfare ships. This will bring about the issue of shipyard
building priorities. At the height of the American naval forces buildup in 1984-85, there was
sufficient naval work available to support the argument that merchant ship construction could
be safely ignored without jeopardizing the shipyard mobilization base. In 1989 it is a dis
credited thesis. The lesson to be learned is that the R.O.C. must not allow naval work to
elbow out commercial construction. Should such occur, ultim=1tely, a large part of the
R.O.C.-flag merchant fleet will be built in foreign yards and will not be coaxed home easily.
Far better for the government to expand its overall shipbuilding capacity to accommodate
both naval and merchant ship construction. Another worthwhile undertaking would be to
examine what might be done with Taiwan's many small boatyards in a mobilization. But
above all, the government must resist the temptation to acquire/build naval shipyards, i.e.,
shipyards devoted exclusively to naval construction and repair. Every independent study that
was ever done (in the United States) showed that government-owned naval shipyards are
very high cost when compared to those in the private sector.
Another problem area wherein the R.O.C. could profit from the American experience is
to explicitly recognize the importance of an adequate shipyard supplier base. The below

quotes from authoritative reports are illustrative.

It is typical of major shipbuilding companies in the United States that
forty to fifty percent of every sales dollar is spent outside their companies on
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materials and services. The evolution of the modern shipbuilder,
forced by the demand to specialize, has brought us to be more accu
rately called ship assemblers. We bring together the materials and
components; we shape the raw materials, install the complex compo
nents, link the hull and machinery andbreathe life into one of the more
complex undertakings of man's imagination. 5
As much as two-thirds of the cost of a major naval combatant ship
acquisition is value added by suppliers, with the remainder of the value
added by the shipbuilder. A productivity improvement of 10 percent
by shipbuilders could save $2.96 billion in the (Navy's)- five-year
prog:raro ... the same hypothetical 10 percent in the supplier's two thirds
of the program...could be $5.92 billion, twice the savings potential in
shipbuilding for the same productivity gain ... 6 Even if manufacturing
cost were halved through productivity improvements, the total cost of
the ship would be reduced by only about 4 or 5 percent. Shipyard
manufacturing productivity improvements... are not the key to substan
tial reduction in warship costs. For that~ it would be better to look at
7
combat systems which represent a much larger portion of total cost
As Taiwan becomes a producer of technologically complex naval combatants, it will
quickly discover how crucial the shipyard supplier is in the scheme of things. Much better
to understand and appreciate this relation before the first frigate is launched...not ten years
down the line.
Should the Republic of China guarantee loans made by private financial institutions to
ship operators who build their ships in the R.O.C. and fly the R.O.C . flag? One thing is
certain. Experience has shown that government loan guarantees cannot be viewed as a stand
along program, i.e., one that will divert an order from a foreign to a Taiwan shipyard. At
best, a ship mortgage guarantee program is only effective at the margin. The delivered price
of the ship must be reasonably close to the world competitive price. In this regard, a guaran
teed loan may lower a lender's rate to the shipowner but probably only marginally lower
than the existing prime rate. Where the mortgage loan prog1am has been effective in the
United States, it has been in conjunction with reserved cargo legislation, and/or construction
and operating differential subsidies.
The concept of the capital construction fund (CCF) as described earlier, is also only
effective in conjunction with other maritime support programs. When such are in place, a
CCF has been shown to assert a strong positive effect on an operator' s decision to replace
his vessels.
Reserving domestic shipping to R.0.C.-built ships would have little impact in 1989.
First, the government is firmly committed to improving its land transport systems with
respect to North-South island freight movements, which will only increase the non-competi
tiveness of coastal shipping. Second, domestic tonnage operating over scheduled routes is
composed of small ships on the order of 200-300 gross tons. In 1989, forty eight fnins
operate 91 ships, over seven routes with a total tonnage of 33,545. In time this may change
as the wisdom of building more highways (that will quickly become congested) is chal
lenged. A current research project-Options To Improve Taiwan Coastal Shipping Serv
ices: A Preliminary Study-should go a long way toward answering questions about the
future of Taiwan's domestic shipping industry and whether it will expand to a point where
larger ships are employed. 9
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Summary
Today, the Republic of China is a high cost producer of merchant ships when compared
to many Asian countries. If a merchant shipbuilding/ship repair industry is to remain in
place, the government
must
be
prepared
to
offset
higher
wage
costs
with
direct
subsidies
to
10
the industry. However, subsidies in addition to the indirect aid presently offered, should
only be granted in cases where the ship(s) will fly the R.O.C. flag and be crewed with R.O.C.
citizens, i.e., contribute to the national security in time of national emergency.
Also, in 1989, the Republic of China embarked on its long awaited construction program
for major naval combatants. The initial builds will be Peny class frigates and, in due course,

state of the art mine hunters. 11

When a nation has both merchant ship and naval building programs, it is essential to
have long run policy guidelines in place. Lack of such a policy has degraded U.S. shipbuild
ing/repair capabilities to an unacceptable level of risk. Of major concern when dual pro
grams operate side by side (merchant ship and naval construction) is the temptation to con
centrate economic resources, technology, and research efforts on naval construction. This
must be avoided at all costs. There are, however, several areas where technology can be
transferred as between naval and commercial construction to the benefit of both. One prom
ising area is developing a super fast commercial ship of between 2500-3000 tons displace
ment, having a design speed between 40-50 knots. The proposed vessel could carry freight
(750-1000 tons), passengers, or both. The Japanese Ministry of Transport has plans for such
a ship. One commercial use for such a vessel would be on scheduled service routes between
North and South Taiwan. A successful service would help to alleviate congestion on the
present road and rail links. The sales potential for such a ship in Asia is almost unlimited,
particularly in the Philippines and Indonesia. Naval uses of such a vessel include:- fast
attack missile ships, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) ships.

NOTES
1

Three of the new orders were cootainerships for the R.O.C.-owned Yang Ming Line. In
February 1989, the R.O.C. Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) ap
proved a proposal by the company to increase its capital by NT$ 18.7 billion to construct
fourteen 3500-3800 TEU containerships .
.

2

"CSBG to Build 8 Frigates For Navy Costing NT$39 billion," China Post , May 9,

1989,po 11.

·

3While cost overruns cannot be eliminated, they can be minimized by a careful evalu
ation of the American experience in building the Peny class frigate. Such an evaluation
should be part of the U.S.-R.O.C. technology transfer.
4

Visit to Chang Hsing Shipbuilding Company, Keelung on 26 April 1989. Professor
Edmand Chang of the National Chiao Tung University acted as interpreter in discussions
with the yard foremano
.
5

Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense, Public Hearings, February 1987-July
1987, p. 917. Statement of A. C. Blandford, Director, Materials Management, Newport News

Shipbuilding.
6

p.15.

National Research Council (U.S.) Toward More Productive Naval Shipbuilding, 1985,
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'U.S., Congress, Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Shipbuilding: Trends and Policy
Choices, 1984, p. 44.
8

Wo1mation supplied by Domestic Shipping Society, Taipei, Republic of China.

9

S tudy funded by Institute of Transport, Ministry of Communications. Edmand Chang,
Associate Professor, National Chiao Tung University is the Principal Investigator.
1

°In 1988, the Republic of China earmarked $350 million over the next three years for
CSBC to continue modernizing its facilities. At present the gove111ment offers loans of 80
percent over 12 years at 8% interest as an inducement to attract new commercial orders.
11

E:xamples of counter-mine warfare ships include the Netherlands Alkmaar class mine
hunter, West Ge11nany's Type 343 minesweeper, Great Britain's Sandown class mine hunter,
and the U.S. Avenger class counter mine measure ship. The China Shipbuilding Corporation
has the capability to build a ship similar to any of the above.
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CHAPTER4
SEAPORTS
In time of peace, seaports are the exit and entry points through which a nation's ocean
commerce flows. The extent to which they seive this purpose depends on (1) the extent and
operational efficiency of port facilities, and (2) the quality of transport systems linking the
port to the land areas it seives. Efficient internal port operations are evidenced by adequate
sheltered anchorages, ample berths, ample and secure storage space, adequate and efficient
ship support facilities, efficient customs and immigration services, and an adequate supply of
skilled labor. The measures of port efficiency are ship tum-a-round time, time the cargo is in
the port before delivery to the consignee or his agent, and cargo throughput, i.e., the capacity
of the port.
The mark of efficient land transport is essentially how quickly the cargo can reach its
destination without loss or damage after clearing the port When the above services can be
offered at costs that are competitive with other port options, then the port and the hinterland
it serves should prosper.
The extent to which a port is competitive vis-a-vis other ports in a large geographical
area will depend upon the port meeting the requirements cited above plus its geographical
location with respect to major trade routes and markets.
The measure of a port's usefulness in wartime is essentially the same as in peacetime
(only the cargoes will differ) with two important exceptions. The first is .... how vulnerable
is the port to enemy attack. Other things equal, ports geographically closer to an enemy's
strike capabilities are more vulnerable and less useful. This was the case with Great Britain
during World War II, The East coast ports of London, Hull, Newcastle-on-Tyne, and Ply
mouth were extremely vulnerable due to their proximity to Geiman air power on the conti
nent. Britain's ocean links with the rest of the world, particularly with North America, ran
through the west coast ports of Belfast, Glasgow, and Liverpool.
The second wartime exception is the ease or difficulty of interdicting the land transport
systems serving the port. The usefulness of a port can be severely degraded by cutting its
links to the interior without ever attacking the port itself. Poor systems such as single lane
highways, single track rail lines, particularly in te11ain where repairs would be difficult, make
successful enemy interdiction all the easier. When interdiction occurs under these circum
stances, a logistical nightmare is created as inward cargo piles up on the docks while outward
freight cannot reach the port
Figure 1 (Chapter 1) shows the location of Taiwan's five main ocean ports Kaohsiung,
Keelung, Taichung, Hualien, and Suao. Figure 3 shows the island's major land transporta
tion arteries serving the ports. Table 8 (Chapter 1) shows peacetime uses of the five ports.
Note that two of the largest ports in te1 ms of tonnage moved are located on the West coast
(Kahosiung and Taichung) opposite mainland China, while Keelung, on the North coast, can
be approached from the mainland by a straight, over water flight. Figure 1 also shows that
the two planned energy ports directly face mainland China across the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan's two least vulnerable ports (to enemy attack) are Hualien and Suao on the East
coast. Both are screened by mountain ranges running almost the entire length of the island as
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shown in Figure 4. Elevations in these ranges are some of the highest in East Asia (Yu Shan
13,~ 13 feet ~d Tsubtaka 12,743 feet) But as noted above, a useful port in either peacetime
or ttl!'e of national emergency requires, among other atuibutes, sufficient berthing space and
efficient land transport links to the interior. Suao and Hualien are deficient on both counts.
Figures 5 and 6 indicate the harbor layout of these ports.
In. 1991 Hualien is expected to have 28 deepwater berths. It now has 19. By contrast,
Kaohsiung can accommodate 135 ships simultaneously. Suao is the smallest of the five
ocean seaports having less than half the number (13) berths as Hualien. Bracketed on three
sides by mountains, with a harbor area of only four square kilometers, significantly expand
ing Suao's berth space will be difficult and expensive.

The second war1ime disadvantage of Hualien and Suao is that land transport systems
linking them to other parts of Taiwan are tenuous, particularly Hualien. The highway and
parallel rail line are two lane and single track for the most part, and are constantly subject to
closure by flooding, mudslides, and cave-ins during periods of heavy rain. Thus, is the
dilemma. Peacetime operations favor ports on the North and West coasts, while ports on the
East coast are less vulnerable to attack by mainland forces, but lack berth space and gcxxi
transport links to the interior.

The American Experience: Relevance For Taiwan
During the Spanish-American War (1898) the single embarkation port for U.S. troops
poised to invade Cuba was Tampa, Florida. A single rail line connected it to points in the
northern United States. Dependence on this one port turned out to be a logistics disaster.
One thousand rail cars (waiting to unload) were backed up as far north as Columbia, South
Carolina, some 500 miles away. Port congestion at U.S. ports also occurred in 1917 when
America entered World I .
...two hundred ships lay in New York harbor awaiting cargoes and fuel while
44,320 carloads of freight (nearly two million tons) backed up on the Atlantic
seaboard as far west as Buffalo and Pittsburgh. 1
•

The obvious conclusion is that the demands of war can easily overload the capacity of a
port or ports and such must be planned for before hostilities breakout-not after. Should
mainland China blockade Taiwan, the ports of Suao and Hualien will become much more
important to the Republic of China's survival than their peacetime use would indicate.
The U.S. Department of Defense has contingency plans for all major American ports. In
1978, the Military Traffic Management Command evaluated 18 major U.S. seaports with
regard to their ability to support a timely deployment of American forces to Europe. In 1983,
the U.S. General Accounting Office identified 28 ports that would be c1itical in a mobiliza
tion. Periodic studies and conferences insure that plans for the wartime use of seaports
remain current.
In the United States, port assets (berths, transit .sheds, warehousing, transportation, and
labor) are provided by both the private sector and government. Government investrrient is
primarily at the state/local level with the exception of maintaining main channel depths,
which is tasked to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Since national security is the sole
responsibility of the federal government, coordination between the various levels of govern
ment and the private sector, is a federal responsibility and is recognized as such. The federal
agency charged with insuring thi_s coordination is the Mili~ Traffi? ~anage~en_t Com
mand. On the civil side, the Nanonal Defense Transportatlon Assoc1at1on, which includes
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both military and civilian members of the transportation community, provides a continuing
forum for discussion of port issues .

. In_ the earlier chapter on merchant shipping, it was suggested that the R.O.C. Navy
penodically sp<?nsor conf~rences/seminars in which the role of shipping company managers
would b_e expla1ned and discussed is time of national emergency. The same suggestion is
made with respect to ''educating'' civilian port officials about their responsibilities in the
event of conflict....here defined as a sea blockade of Taiwan by mainland China.

Summary
Should a blockade of Taiwan by mainland China occur, it will be absolutely essential for
the R.O.C. to quickly show that the blockade can be broken--that Taiwan's sea lines of
communication (SLOC) remain open. In this respect, demonstrating that the 1948 Soviet
land blockade of Berlin could be broken was a major goal of the American ajrlift operation.
For the foreseeable future, the R.O.C. Navy will not have the ability to maintain effec
tive control of all the approaches to all of its seapons. Nor does it have a submarine fleet
capable of mounting an effective counter blockade that would divert a significant part of
mainland China naval forces. What the R.O.C. Navy does have is the ability to exact a high
price from enemy blockade forces when its forces are dedicated to insuring sea control with
respect to one or two ports. Thus, early on a decision will have to be made as to which port
or ports will handle most of the tonnage entering and leaving the island.
It may well be that Kaohsiung and Keelung are the best candidate ports at which to
concentrate R.O.C. naval forces. But should the choice later prove to be an untenable
option, contingency plans for the use of alternate ports must already be in place.
Should mainland China limit its blockade to submarine and small, fast attack (missile,
gun, torpedo) craft, the R.O.C. Navy would likely have to contend with an operational sub
marine fleet of 30-40 boats, a flotilla of 300-400 fast attack craft, and a fleet of some 20 ships
with mine laying capabilities.2 In addition to its mine layers, mainland China has a maritime
patrol bomber (PS-5) with a range and endurance to lay mines anywhere in the Taiwan Strait
and beyond.
Whether mainland China would escalate its blockade to include air attacks on seaports
would largely depend on the success of the sea blockade. If plans are in place to quickly
mobilize R.O.C. maritime assets as discussed in this paper, th,e odds are a surface only
blockade will fail. In this event there would be at least a 50-50 chance that the communist
leadership would be willing to risk escalation rather than admit to failure.
While it is quite easy to digress into a discussion of naval tactics and various conflict
scenarios, it should be understood that such digressions in this chapter are made only to
highlight the imponance of seapons as essential elements of maritime power.

NOTES
1James

A. Huston, The Sinews of War: A1niy Logistics 1775-1953 (Washington, D .C.:
Office of Chief of Military History, 1966), p.343.
2The question of whether mainland China would risk its 50 odd destroyers and frigates
in the Taiwan Strait is problematic. In the initial phase of a blockade, probably not, given
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that control of air space over the Strait would be far from assured. As in the case of whether
to attack R.O.C. seaports, the answer depends on the successes of its submarines, small
attack craft, and mine warfare ships. The capabilities of the naval fore es of mainland China
and the Republic of China are estimated from published force levels as of 19880
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CHAPTERS
CONCLUSION
In late ~988 the Re~u.blic of C_hina's indigenous defense fighter (IDF)-the Ching
kuo~made its debut. Initial test flights were successful and present plans call for building
some 250 planes. The second step with respect to achieving self sufficiency in sophisticated
weapo~ came when the China Shipbuilding Corporation was tasked to build eight Perry
class frigates. The program calls for a total build of 24 ships some of which may be pur
chased in South Korea.
This paper, however, is not concerned with the highly visible components of R.O.C.
national security-warships, fighter aircraft, tanks and the like, but rather with its less visible
maritime assets.-its merchant ships, its shipyards, and seaports. Should mainland China's
communist leaders decide to blockade Taiwan, these assets, particularly merchant ships, will
be the crucial link between the R.O.C. and the rest of the world. Thus, in peacetime, this role
must be appreciated and plans made well in advance of a national emergency.
Not so many years ago the United States considered its merchant marine as ''the fourth
arm of national defense." Government fmancial support kept at sea an American-flag mer
chant fleet of sufficient size to support deployed U.S. military forces anywhere in the world.
So too with shipyards. Government subsidies allowed the industry to deliver merchant
vessels to American-flag operators at competitive world prices. When contrasted to other
defense expenditures or even failed programs, the cost of keeping maritime assets in place,
was minuscule. Nonetheless in 1981 the decision was made to rely on foreign flag, foreign
crewed merchant ships and foreign shipyards to meet American commercial maritime re
q11irements in peacetime, while wartime requirements were scaled back to match dwindling
maritime resources. The irony is that the amount saved by the government over a ten year
period would be insufficient to purchase even 20 of the new B-2 (Stealth) bombers.
While the present American policy of neglecting maritime assets is one of very high
risk, particularly in limited conflicts, the awesome military nuclear capability of the United
States can still guarantee its sovereignty. Not so in the case of the Republic of China. It has
but one war to lose and the threat to its sovereignty comes from a country with the largest
army in the world and only a hundred or so miles away.

Allies
The United States has allies that it can count on with varying degrees of certainty. In
this regard, some NATO countries have committed merchant ships in a common cause
emergency, although shipowners in these nations are increasingly relying on foreign crews as
a way of cutting operating costs. The R.O.C., however, is without allies. The closest thing to
an ally is the United States and its commitment under the Taiwan Relations Act to see that
the ''Taiwan issue'' is resolved peaceably. Appendix A is an abstract of the Act which in
cludes a statement of U.S. policy toward threats to the integrity of Taiwan. Appendix B
documents Sino-American relations between 1682 and 1989.
While it might be argued that the United ·S tates is an ally of sorts, it would be foolish in
the extreme for Taiwan to count on direct American intervention in the event of a blockade
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by mainland China. In his Senate confumation hearings as Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Richard P. Solomon said the United States would stand by the
Taiwan Relations Act. 1 The problem is that Solomon also stated that the United States would
abide by communiques signed with mainland China. The two most important are the Shang
hai communique of 1972 in which the United States and the People's Republic of China
agreed that the question of Taiwan was a Chinese problem and should be solved by the
Chinese themselves. The 1982 communique committed the United States to limit (and
decrease) the level of ru111s sales to Taiwan and to limit such sales to defensive arms. For
their part, mainland China holds that the Taiwan Relations Act is a barrier to the resolution of
the Taiwan question. And as stated above, the communist government in Peking has never
ruled out the use of force to reunify Taiwan and the mainland.
In the final analysis, the American response to a mainland blockade of Taiwan will
depend entirely upon the sitting U.S. president An immediate and clear cut statement that
the United States would convoy ships into and out of Taiwan would probably end the threat.
The question is--will it be made?2

Final Comments
In 1987 and 1988 a presidentially appointed Commission on Merchant Marine and
Defense recorded over 1300 pages of testimony as to how to resurrect America's maritime
assets. Thus far, nothing has come of the Commission's recommendations, nor is any action
likely. Nevertheless, lessons can be learned from past American experience. The major ones
are:

1. A large part of R.O.C.-owned shipping must be kept under its own flag and crewed
with R.O.C. officers and seamen. If direct government assistance is needed to assure
this end, then the assistance must be forthcoming.
2. Taiwan's shipbuilding industry must never abandon commercial construction, over
haul and repair. If higher Taiwan wages should lead to a significant contraction of
the industry, then the government must be prepared to directly subsidize commercial
construction.

30 Republic of China merchant vessels must be fitted with national defense features to
enhance their usefulness in time of emergency. Lacking that, comprehensive plans
must be ready to quickly add NDFs in the event of conflict.
4. Exercises between R.O.C. merchant and naval vessels must be held on a regular
basis. Proficiency in naval science as it applies to merchant ship operations in a
national emergency must be qualification for every R.0.C. merchant marine officer.
Courses in naval science must be incorporated into fo11nal maritime education pro
grams. e.g. programs at the National Taiwan Ocean University.
5. Seminars for shipping company managers must be held periodically to explain their
roles/responsibilities in the event of a blockade. The same would apply to civilian
shipyard and port officials.
6. Plans must be made to quickly expand the throughput capabilities of Suao and Hual
ien ports should the need arise. The proposed East-West, cross island highway is an
important project in this respect. It might also be noted that should the United States
undertake to convoy Taiwan bound ships, it would likely confme its operations to
the Pacific Ocean and not send naval vessels into the Taiwan Strait.
48

7. A detail~ inventory of R.O.C. maritime assets, particularly merchant ships, must
be compiled and kept current, as must a roster of R.O.C. merchant mariners no
longer employed at sea.
8. The_ R.O:~· fi_shing fleet must be viewed as a national security asset and plans made
for its utilization should a blockade occur. For while a wooden hull does not a mine
hunter make--it is a beginning. Modest subsidies to encourage the building of such
hulls is worth considering.
9. Plans must be made for acquiring foreign tonnage in time of emergency. A major
responsibility of designated R.O.C. officials abroad would be to maintain a current
list of suitable merchant ships worldwide that might quickly be acquired to replace
R.O.C.-flag losses.

10. All officials, at whatever level of government, must be made aware that R.O.C.
maritime assets are defense assets and that funds spent on their maintenance and
procurement are as important as monies spent on conventional weapons.
In conclusion, one mjght ask-when (under what conditions) would mainland China
end a sea blockade of Taiwan? The two obvious answers are (1) When the R.O.C . agrees to
mainland China te1ms, or (2) when the cost of the blockade (to mainland China) becomes too
high relative to any possible gains in continuing it. Ending the blockade on te11ns favorable
to the R.O.C. will, however, depend upon the ability of its merchant ships to maintain
Taiwan's ocean links with the rest of the world. So it was the Berlin blockade of 1948. It
ended when Berlin demonstrated it could remain economically viable. In the case of the
R.O.C., demonstrating its economic viability should a blockade occur, will depend not on air
planes but on its merchant ships, shipyards, and seaports.
The paper has outlined what the author believes to be the essential elements of a long
run R.O.C. maritime policy. And while the observations and recommendations made are
broad and lacking in detailed analysis, they do identify maritime problem areas that must be
addressed by a nation whose very existence depends upon uninterrupted use of the oceans.

NOTES
1 "Solomon:

U.S. Committed to Six Point Assurance," China Post, June 14, 1989, p. 14.

2Two options are open to the Peking government. First, the intent to blockade could be
announced before the fact. In this case conditions for reunification would be stated and the
peaceful intent of the Communist leadership stressed. The advantage in this strategy would
be in the creation of a Munich-like atmosphere wherein the major powers would prevail upon
Taiwan to accept the ''one country, two economic systems'' proposal or whatever offer was
put on the table, rather than risk conflict. The second option would be to impose the block
ade and then discuss the conditions for peace in the Taiwan Strait In this case, the ball
would be in the U.S. court. In 1989, the most likely response would be an appeal to diplo
macy, in which event, raising the blockade would fall entirely upon the R.O.C.'s armed
forees and its merchant marine.
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APPENDIX A
TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT
PUBLIC LAW 96-8-April 10, 1979
[Abstract]
Public Law 96-8
96th Congress

•

To help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the foreign
policy of the Unite<l States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other
relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, and for other
purposes.

Sec. 2
(a) The president having te11ninated governmental relations between the United States and the
governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the RqJublic of China to
January 1, 1979, the Congress finds that the enactment of this Act is necessary(!) to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Weste111 Pacific; and

(2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of
commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the
people on Taiwan.
\

(b) It is the policy of the United States-( 1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other
relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the
people on the China mainland and all other people of the W estem Pacific area;

(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security and economic
interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;
(3) to make clear that u'ie United States' decision to establish diplomatic relations with the
People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be .
determined by peaceful means;
(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means,
including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western
Pacific area of grave concern to the United States;
(5) to provide Taiwan with air11s of a defensive character, and
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other fo1ms of
coercion that would jeopardize the security-, or the social or economic system, of the
people on Taiwan.
·
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Sec. 3

(a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United States will make
available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
(b) The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense

articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in
accordance with procedures established by law. Such deter111ination of Taiwan's defense
needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with
·
recommendations to the President and the Congress.
(c) The President is directed to inf01m the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or
the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of
the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in
accordance with con·stitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in
response to any such danger.
Sece4

(a) For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United States, the Congress
approves the continuation in force of all treaties and other international agreements,
including multilateral conventions, entered into by the United States and the governing
authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to
January 1, 1979, and in force between them on December 31, 1978, unless and until
te1111inated in accordance with law.
.

(b) Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion
of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any

other international organization.
Sec.6

(a) Progiams, transactions, and any other relations conducted or carried out by the President
or any agency of the United States Goverr,ment with respect to Taiwan shall, in the
manner and to extent directed by the President, be conducted and carried out by or
through(!) The American Institute of Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation incorporated under the laws

of the District of Col11mbia, or
(2) such comparable successor nongovernmental entity as the President may designate.
Sec.14

(a) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate, and other appropriate committees of the Congress shall monitor-(I) the implementation of the provisions of this Act;
(2) the operation and procedures of the Institute;
(3) the legal and technical aspects of the continuing relationship between the United States and
Taiwan; and
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(4) the implementation of the policies of the United States concerning security and cooperation
in East Asia.

(b) Such committees shall report,as appropriate, to their respective Houses on the results of their
monitoring.

Sec. 15
(1) the te1m ''laws of the United States'' includes any statute, rule, regulation, ordinance,
order, or judicial rule of decision of the United States or any political subdivision thereof;
and

(2) the te1m ''Taiwan'' includes, as the context may require, the islands of Taiwan and the
Pescadores, the people on those islands, corporations and other entities and associations
created or organized under the laws applied on those islands, and the governing authorities
on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1,
1979, and any successor governing authorities (including political subdivisions, agencies,
and instrumentalities thereof).
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APPENDIXB
UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS, 1682-1989

1682

Taiwan becomes a part of China.

1784

American ship, Empress ofChina, arrives Whampoa

1912

Manchu dynasty overthrown-Republic of China established.

1913

United States recogniz.es Republic of China.

1913

Japan begins occupation of Manchuria. In 1937 Japan begins undeclared war agajnst
China.

1941

Japan attacks Pearl Harbor-United States declares war on Japan.

1945

World War II ends. Chinese communists openly challenge authority of Republic of
China.
.

1945-47

United States attempts to mediate dispute between Chinese nationalists (R.O.C.) an,d
Chinese communists.

1947

Constitution of Republic of China takes effect.

1947-48

United States disengages from China civil war.

1948

Republic of China constitution suspended.

1949

United States ''White Paper'' on China rationalizes U.S. non support of R.O.C.
government.

1949

Chinese communists complete conquest of mainland China. Republic of China
moves seat of government to Taipei on island of Taiwan.

1950

Korea War begins. United States reevaluates relation with R.O.C. U.S. 7th fleet
ordered to protect Taiwan.

1955

R.O.C.-United States Mutual Security Treaty ratified by U.S. Senate. U.S.
committed to protect Taiwan.

1958

Chinese communists blockade Quemoy Island-supply convoy escorted by U.S.
ships.

1958-59

Relations between People's Republic of China and Soviet Union begin to deteriorate.
U.S.S.R. views Taiwan and offshore•islands as internal Chinese affair.

1965

U.S. direct aid to R.O.C. ends
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trade opened with China.

1951-65

U.S. aid to R.O.C. estimated at $1 .5 billion.

1971

United Nations seats People's Republic of China
from U.N.

1973

United States begins withdrawing armed forces from Taiwan from a peak of about
9,000 personnel.

1979

United States recognizes People's Republic of China. U.S. gives one year notice of
intent to end Mutual Security Treaty. Taiwan Relations Act approved by U.S.
Congress.

1980-87

Republic of China on Taiwan becomes world economic power while maintaining
position as a regional military power.

1989

Republic_of China continuing trade surplus with the Unite States is a issue in
U.S.-R.O.C. economic relations.

Republic of China withdraws

People's Liberation Army massacres student demonstrators in Peking's Tienanmen
Square. Casualties estimated in the thousands. U.S. response is relatively
restrained
U.S. Marine Lt. Colonel William Higgins, taken hostage in 1988, killed by Iran
sponsored terrorist organization(s) in Lebanon. While date of death was uncertain,
Ame1ican authorities were satisfied the video tape of a hanged bcxly was that of
Colonel Higgins. U.S. response was a renewed call for increased diplomatic efforts
to end the decade old hostage crisis.
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